

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 250781

EXDIS MILITARY PLEASE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO USNATO, ANKARA, ATHENS,
BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LISBON, LONDON, LUXEMBOURG,
OSLO, OTTAWA, PARIS, REYKJAVIK, ROME FROM MADRID OCT 18:

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

DEPARTMENT PASS SECDEF, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEEC

E.O.:11652: GDS
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SUBJECT: SPANISH ENTRY INTO NATO

REF: (A) STATE 226467 (DTG 210232Z SEP 77)
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1. SUMMARY. WE FULLY AGREE WITH THE GENERAL THRUST OF
BOTH REFS A AND B. THE PRESENT US POSTURE OF SUPPORT FOR
SPANISH MEMBERSHIP WITHOUT PRESSURE OR ANY PRECONCEIVED
TIMETABLE, COUPLED WITH DISCREET EFFORTS TO MEET SPANISH
NEEDS FOR BOTH INFORMATION ON THE ALLIANCE AND DIALOGUE
ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP, IS CLEARLY APPRECIATED
BY THE GOS. WE ARE PERHAPS LESS SANGUINE THAN SOME ABOUT
US ABILITY TO ORCHESTRATE THE EFFORT TO BRING SPAIN INTO
THE ALLIANCE, OR LONG TO POSTPONE COMING TO GRIPS, IN
DIALOGUE WITH THE GOS, WITH THE INEVITABLE IMPLICATIONS

FOR OUR BILATERAL DEFENSE RELATIONS OF A SPANISH DECISION ON NATO MEMBERSHIP. THESE AND SEVERAL MORE DETAILED MATTERS ARE DISCUSSED BELOW. END SUMMARY.

2. THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS SPANISH GOVERNMENT WISHES TO BRING SPAIN INTO NATO AS PART OF ITS LARGER EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY FIRMLY AT HOME, TO REESTABLISH SPAIN'S EUROPEAN CREDENTIALS, AND TO RECONFIRM AND RESTRUCTURE SPAIN'S ROLE IN THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST. BUT GOS LEADERS AS YET HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA HOW TO MANAGE THE INEVITABLE SHARP PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON NATO AND ON US BASE FACILITIES IN SPAIN, AND THEY MAY WELL NOT BE ABLE TO DICTATE THEIR TIMING.

3. SUAREZ' AND OREJA'S BELIEF THAT THE SOCIALISTS AND OTHER OPPOSITION ELEMENTS ARE NOT INCLINED TO PRESS THESE ISSUES TO DEBATE NOW IS REFLECTED IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT THEMSELVES PROVOKE DEBATE BY APPEARING IN ANY WAY TO PREEMPT IT. BECAUSE OF CURRENT PSOE OPPOSITION AND BECAUSE OF THE MANY PRESSING INTERNAL ISSUES THAT PREOCCUPY THEM, THEY NOW SEEM INCLINED TO POSTPONE EVEN ANY PRELIMINARY PUBLIC OR CONFIDENTIAL

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PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON NATO AND THE BASES UNTIL NEXT YEAR - AND PERHAPS EVEN LATE NEXT YEAR - IF POSSIBLE. THIS HESITANCY ALSO RECOGNIZES THE THINNESS OF ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR SPANISH MEMBERSHIP WITHIN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY, WHILE IT RELIES ON THE GENERAL PASSIVITY OF PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE CONTINUED US MILITARY PRESENCE DURING THE LIFE OF THE TREATY (TO SEPT. 1981).

4. IN THIS SITUATION, SEVERAL ISSUES ARE POSED FOR THE US:

(A) WHETHER OR NOT TO PRESS FOR AN EARLY SPANISH DECISION ON NATO: ARGUING FOR THIS IS PRINCIPALLY THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCCESSOR SPANISH GOVERNMENTS MAY BE LESS FAVORABLY INCLINED THAN THIS ONE. BUT SUCH A TACTIC WOULD PROBABLY NOT SUCCEED. IT WOULD NOT LIKELY BE IN SUAREZ' INTEREST, OR OUR OWN, TO ATTEMPT TO BRING SPAIN INTO NATO IN DISREGARD OF DETERMINED OPPOSITION FROM THE PRESENT LARGE SOCIALIST MINORITY IN PARLIAMENT.

(B) TO WHAT EXTENT THE US SHOULD SEEK TO "MANAGE" DEVELOPMENTS: THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR BRINGING SPAIN INTO THE ALLIANCE ARE TO BE FOUND IN FOLDING IT INTO THE PROCESS -- BROADLY SUPPORTED IN SPAIN -- OF REJOINING EUROPE. FOR THIS TO TAKE PLACE, THE ACTIVE DISPLAY OF INTEREST (AS OPPOSED TO ACTIVELY PRESSING) MUST PASS IN CONSIDERABLE MEASURE FROM THE US TO OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR SPAIN WILL HAVE TO BE, VERY MUCH MORE THAN IS NOW THE CASE, THE PRODUCT

OF DISCUSSIONS AMONG EUROPEANS. SOME SPANIARDS, PARTICULARLY IN THE MILITARY, STRONGLY DOUBT THAT N. EUROPEANS WILL PROVE WILLING TO ASSUME BURDENS PECULIAR TO SPANISH DEFENSE INTERESTS ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK. ALSO, THEY ARE LIKELY TO WANT TO SEE MATTERS ON A MORE SOLID FOOTING WITH THE EC BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO THE ALLIANCE.

(C) HOW TO NEGOTIATE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF FULL MEMBER-CONFIDENTIAL

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SHIP: ALTHOUGH SOME SPANISH OFFICIALS ARE DISCUSSING AMONG THEMSELVES THE MERITS OF A "SIGN THE TREATY, THEN NEGOTIATE" POSTURE, THE MORE TRADITIONAL SPANISH INCLINATION IS TO NEGOTIATE FIRST IN GREAT DETAIL AND AT GREAT LENGTH. IMPORTANT WILL BE DECISIONS ON THE TACTICS OF HANDLING SUCH MATTERS AS GIBRALTAR, THE STAH TROOPS ABROAD OR OF OTHER NATO MEMBER TROOPS IN SPAIN, THE PLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SPAIN, AND THE DIRECT CIVIL AND MILITARY COSTS OF MEMBERSHIP FOR SPAIN. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, THAT SPAIN MUST ASSUME "FULL" MEMBERSHIP IF SHE IS TO JOIN, MAY BE OBSCURING THE FACT THAT FULL MEMBER-SHIP DOES NOT NECESSARILY ENTAIL ACCEPTING FOREIGN TROOPS OR THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON SPANISH SOIL. ALSO, THE SPANISH AS FULL MEMBERS WILL DEMAND FULL ATTENTION TO THEIR PARTICULAR STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS. PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR SPANIARDS AND FOR MOST NATO ALLIES WILL BE DECISIONS ON THE ROLE THE ALLIES MIGHT BE ASKED TO PLAY IN THE CANARIES, WITH REGARD TO A POTENTIAL ATTACK FROM NORTH AFRICA ON SPAIN, AND - TO A LESSER EXTENT - WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ENCLAVES OF CEUTA AND MELILLA.

(D) WHAT THE EVENTUAL US MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPAIN MIGHT BE: IN OR OUT OF NATO, SPANISH OPINION LEANS TOWARD A REDUCTION OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE OVER TIME. THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS MADE CLEAR ITS VIEW THAT IT IS NOT TOO SOON TO BEGIN LOOKING AT ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS, ALTHOUGH IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY HAVE FEW IF ANY VIEWS AS TO WHAT THESE MAY BE.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE WOULD PUT FORWARD THE FOLLOWING ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS. IN GENERAL, WE SHOULD CONFIDENTIAL

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-- AVOID ATTEMPTING TO ORCHESTRATE TOO CLOSELY SPAIN-NATO DEVELOPMENTS. TREATMENT GIVEN THIS AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS SHOULD NOT BE SUCH AS TO FORCE THE PACE WITHIN SPAIN. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION ANY FORMAL ACTION ON SPAIN AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS

COULD PROVE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE, SO THAT INDICATIONS OF RECEPTIVITY TO SPAIN, WHICH ARE USEFUL, MIGHT BEST BE PRODUCED IN THE CORRIDORS. CONSIDERATION OF HOW THE GOS MIGHT BE TIED IN WITH EVENTS AT THE SPRING SUMMIT IS PERHAPS BEST LEFT FOR LATER.

-- PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON ENCOURAGING ALLIED INITIATIVES, EXTENDING BEYOND EXPRESSIONS OF GOOD WILL TO CONCRETE INITIATIVES AT INTER-PARLIAMENTARY, PARTY-TO-PARTY AND MILITARY-TO-MILITARY LEVELS, IN ADDITION TO INTENSIFIED DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS. WE WOULD TAKE ISSUE WITH USNATO'S RELUCTANCE TO ASSIGN THE EUROGROUP -- THE MOST VIABLE EXPRESSION OF THE "EUROPEANNESS" OF NATO -- A SIGNIFICANT ROLE. RELATIONS BETWEEN RULING SOCIALIST PARTIES IN THE ALLIANCE AND THE SPANISH PSOE COULD PROVE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE ALLIANCE SOCIALIST PARTIES CAN BE VEHICLES FOR CONVINCING THE PSOE OF THE STRENGTH OF SPANISH SELF-INTEREST IN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

-- DIRECT MORE CONTACTS INTO IS/IMS CHANNELS, I.E., BETWEEN SPAIN AND NATO AS AN INSTITUTION. SUCH CONTACTS COULD HELP CONSIDERABLY IN CORRECTING SPANISH MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT HOW NATO FUNCTIONS, AS WELL AS IN APPEALING TO SPANISH PRIDE, BUT WILL FOR NOW HAVE TO FALL SHORT OF ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT APPEAR IN SPAIN TO HAVE PREEMPTED THE PROMISED FULL PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON NATO MEMBERSHIP.

-- EXTEND FURTHER OUR PATTERNS OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSULTATIONS, AND MAINTAIN THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
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WITH SPAIN IN MATTERS OF ARMS TRANSFERS. ON MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES BEFORE THE ALLIANCE, ON BROADER QUESTIONS OF DETENTE (E.G., THE E-W STUDY), ON THE STABILITY OF YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA (MATTERS THE SPANISH BELIEVE HAVE A BEARING ON POSSIBLE SPANISH MEMBERSHIP), WE MIGHT WELL CONSULT MORE CLOSELY WITH THE GOS THAN IN THE PAST. BEFORE PLACING NEW DIFFICULTIES IN THE PATH OF THE SPANISH NAVY'S DESIRE TO BUILD A SEA CONTROL SHIP BY WITHDRAWING AUTHORITY FOR 3RD COUNTRY SALES, WE MIGHT REEXAMINE THE IMPACT ON SPANISH ASSUMPTION OF SIGNIFICANT NAVAL TASKS IN THE ATLANTIC.

-- EXERCISE CAUTION IN SEEKING NEW UNILATERAL MILITARY FACILITIES AND NEW OPERATIONAL PRIVILEGES IN SPAIN NOT CLEARLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE TREATY, IN THE INTEREST OF AVOIDING PLACING THE GOS LEADERSHIP UNNECESSARILY AT A DISADVANTAGE VIS-A-VIS ITS OPPONENTS IN ANY DEBATE ON NATO OR THE US MILITARY FACILITIES

IN SPAIN. UTILIZING US CAPABILITIES HERE, SEEK OUT OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SPAIN WHICH UNDERLINE THE EXISTENCE OF A RELATIONSHIP OF PARTNERSHIP. ONE EXAMPLE: IF WE ARE TO PRESERVE OVER THE LONG RUN AN AERIAL REFUELING CAPABILITY IN SPAIN, A WAY MIGHT BE SOUGHT TO MAKE THIS DIRECTLY USEFUL TO THE SPANISH ARMED FORCES.

-- TAKE SERIOUSLY THE SPANISH CONVICTION THAT A DECISION ON NATO WILL AFFECT BILATERAL DEFENSE RELATIONS, SPECIFICALLY THAT WITH SPAIN IN NATO THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPAIN COULD BE REDUCED, BUT THAT AVAILABILITY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDED MODERNIZATION OF SPANISH FORCES FROM ALL NATO SOURCES
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SHOULD BE INCREASED, NOT DECREASED. BEFORE WE CAN BE RESPONSIVE TO REPEATED GOS INVITATIONS TO ENTER INTO SUCH DISCUSSIONS ON A HYPOTHETICAL BASIS, THE ISSUE BEARS FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON.

6. SPAIN IS ALREADY THE OBJECT OF GREATER RECOGNITION AND CONTACTS WITH THE ALLIES, AS WELL AS OF A GREATER FLOW OF INFORMATION ON THE ALLIANCE FROM US. STEPS ARE NOW UNDERWAY (LEGERE VISIT; EVENTUAL HIGH-LEVEL SEMINAR) TO ENTER INTO MORE SIGNIFICANT HYPOTHETICAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SPANISH MEMBERSHIP. ALL THIS IS USEFUL, AND WILL BECOME MORE USEFUL AS WE CLARIFY IN HOUSE EXACTLY WHAT THE ALTERNATIVES ARE. TO THIS END, WE LOOK FORWARD TO MORE REGULAR CONSULTATIONS, AS SUGGESTED BY USNATO.

7. OTHER SHORT-TERM MEASURES, ADDITIONAL TO THOSE PUT FORWARD IN REFS A AND B, WHICH WOULD MERIT ATTENTION INCLUDE:

-- AN EARLY CINCEUR VISIT TO SPAIN;

-- AN OFFER OF A VISIT TO NATO BY SPANISH MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION WITH NATO;

-- MAINTENANCE OF THE OFFER TO RECEIVE A SPANISH LIAISON OFFICER AT HQ. EUCOM; POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF THIS OFFER TO INCLUDE US HEADQUARTERS WHICH ALSO HAVE NATO FUNCTIONS;

-- INVITATIONS TO SPANISH SPEAKERS BY THE NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE;

-- BILATERAL CONSULTATION ON SELECTED ISSUES BEFORE THE ALLIANCE PRIOR TO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, ADDITIONAL TO CONTINUED IN-DEPTH BRIEFINGS FOLLOWING MINISTERIALS;

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- AN INVITATION TO OFFICIAL SPANISH OBSERVERS TO ATTEND
A CCMS PLENARY SESSION;
- DISCUSSIONS ON LINKAGE OF THE SPANISH AIR DEFENSE
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM (COMBAT GRANDE) TO NATO SYSTEMS
NOW THAT COMBAT GRANDE IS BECOMING FUNCTIONAL;
- CONTINUING REVIEW OF US DISCLOSURE POLICY TOWARD SPAIN,
COUPLED WITH AN ALLIED INVENTORY OF PUBLICATIONS
RELEASABLE TO SPAIN;
- PROMOTION OF ACADEMIC STUDIES ON SPAIN AND NATO
(WE NOTE ONE SUCH EFFORT, BY THE FLEDGLING INSTITUTE
FOR CONFLICT AND POLICY STUDIES IN WASHINGTON, WHICH
IS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY PROF. WILLIAM SALISBURY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA);
- ENCOURAGEMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT BY ADDITIONAL ALLIES
OF MILITARY ATTACHE SLOTS IN MADRID, WHICH HOPEFULLY
THE GOS MIGHT RECIPROCAT;
- ENCOURAGEMENT (AS EARLIER SUGGESTED BY USNATO) OF
IS/IMS INVENTORYING OF SPANISH INVOLVEMENT IN JOINT
EXERCISING AND THE OBSERVATION OF ALLIED MANEUVERS.
STABLER UNQUOTE VANCE

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